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On October 13, the Spanish Government presented a bill to Parliament with one
main objective: to reduce the parliamentary majorities to appoint the members
of the General Council of the Judiciary. Its purpose is to overcome a political
blockage in the renewal of its members, which has already lasted two years. But
the government’s attempt, somehow awkward, has been quickly compared to
maneuvers to control the judiciary in Poland and Hungary. However, this bill and
those exaggerated criticisms conceal a much more relevant and, above all, sadder
reality.
Politicized judiciary
Many voices have long denounced that Spanish justice is not really independent, at
least in its high courts. Spanish media constantly highlight this, usually by pointing
to judges as “progressive” or “conservative”, not simply indicating an ideological
tendency, but rather intending to stress a political dependency incompatible with
the judicial function. Very recently, on September 21, 2020, Luis Navajas Ramos,
Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, made public statements referring to prosecutors in
exactly the same way, confirming the suspicion. Those suspicions are also endorsed
through two reports. One from GRECO (Group of States against Corruption) of the
Council of Europe, and another from the European Commission.
GRECO has pointed out the Spanish justice system on several occasions for
not effectively fighting politicisation in the Spanish judiciary. In its latest report of
June 3, 2020, GRECO has again quoted the General Council of the Judiciary,
the head institution of Spanish Justice, which would be conditioned by the system
of appointment of its members, being excessively political. These members are
appointed by a majority of 3/5 in each chamber – congress and senate –, and in this
election the judges have little indirect influence.
The European Union report points out the real problem even more clearly,
confirming journalistic suspicions. In the 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard, the European
Commission has ranked Spain number 19 (out of 27) in terms of independence
perceived by the general population, attributing this lack of autonomy mainly to
political interference, although also from other powers that be. By the way, the
diagnosis of the population is shared by economic actors.
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Blocking and exploiting
The last chapter in this story is very recent. The spanish right-wing “Popular Party”
has been blocking the renewal of the General Council of the Judiciary, whose
mandate expired two years ago. It has never been easy to reach agreements in
this regard between the two majority parties. Therefore, extensions in the mandates
of the Council were not uncommon, but today’s extreme situation had never been
reached. The difference now is that the political blockade and those responsible are
too obvious, according to almost all the voices that have expressed their opinion on
the subject, except those of the Popular Party itself.
The main problem is that this extension has been used by the expired Council –
with a majority of members promoted by the Popular Party – to continue making
appointments to the high Spanish courts, particularly in the Supreme Court and more
precisely to its Criminal Chamber. It is this Chamber that is competent to judge the
crimes of the members of the Government, as well as deputies and senators, among
others. And it is also the last appeals tribunal.
The impact of the last seven years of the judiciary governed by this Council is self-
evident. The highest positions in the Spanish judiciary have been decided by a
majority of magistrates who are labeled by the media as conservative, in a similar
way to what is happening, for similar reasons, in the US Federal Supreme Court.
This conservative majority in the Council also explains why the Popular Party is
reluctant to renew the body. Considering the corruption cases that affect the political
parties in Spain, being able to appoint the key judges of the Spanish judiciary is
undoubtedly a very effective tool. Some persons have even stated that this could
help the politicians that have been or could be charged in the future. The senator
Ignacio Cosidó, member of the Popular Party, sent a whatsapp to his colleagues
in the parliamentary group in November 2018 that was leaked to the press. In this
whatsapp he talked of ending up “controlling the Second Chamber from behind” –
the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court –, and added: “[W]e were risking the
future renewals of 2/3 of the Supreme Court and hundreds of appointments in the
judiciary, vital for the Popular Party and for the future of Spain.”
Opaque appointments
The problem is not new. It has been dragging on for a long time and is, despite
the many years of democracy, a direct consequence of the Francoist influence
that obviously existed in the Spanish judiciary until the end of the dictatorship. The
first democratic socialist government, in the early eighties of the twentieth century,
tried to make the judiciary ideologically more plural through two quite common and
controversial mechanisms: the early retirement in 1984 of civil servants in general
aged 65 – which also affected some judges – and the public offering of a large
number of new judge posts, assuming that the new judges, being younger, would be
more progressive.
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But this was a tremendous naivety. The main problem of the Justice in Spain is not
so much its current composition, but access to judicial posts, which is not really
transparent. This system has not been substantially modified since the dictatorship,
and is currently as follows: after passing a multiple choice exam, the second phase
consists of two oral examinations in which only memory is evaluated. Candidates
have to expose in a limited time, at breakneck speed – sometimes inaudible and
always difficult to follow – five topics from a 320-lesson program of various legal
items, mainly Civil, Criminal and Procedural Law. The examinations are celebrated
before a comission composed of a judge of the Supreme Court, two more judges,
two prosecutors, a university law-professor, a State Lawyer (Abogado del Estado), a
lawyer and a Clerk from the Administration of Justice. The comission does not justify
why the candidate passed or not the exam, but only awards the result.
The composition of this comission is very important. The president is chosen by
the president of the Supreme Court – who is chosen by the General Council of the
Judiciary – and the State Attorney General, who is chosen by the Government. The
two Judges are elected by the General Council of the Judiciary, the two prosecutors
by the State Attorney General, and the State Attorney and the Clerk by the Ministry
of Justice (art. 304 of the Law of the Judiciary). This means that if a Government has
managed to appoint, as usual, a majority of members of the Council, it will also have
the key to who will access the post of judge, which will undoubtedly condition the
future of the judicial body.
In addition, in this examination, there is a sort of “personal coach” who plays a really
opaque role, although supposedly decisive. The “coaches” tend to be active judges
who in their spare time help candidates to prepare for the exam. But they are not
officially appointed. There are only rumors about the reality of their work and their
remuneration as there is absolutely no information available. Most candidates –
and some judges – state that it is not possible to undergo the examination without
a “coach”. Such strange but very frequent statements are very well known and can
be easily verified by checking comments on this topic, by the judges themselves, on
social networks.
Conservative path dependency
As I said before, this reality is not new and started under the dictatorship – or even
before – and has remained formally the same throughout Spanish democracy.
Most of those who already held the position of judges when democracy came,
were obviously conservatives. They kept their posts afterwards and there were
no renewals beyond the indirect mechanisms already mentioned. Under these
conditions, it cannot be surprising that the judiciary in Spain continued to be mostly
conservative, because there was a historical continuity.
There is important evidence of that. In Spain there are six “judicial associations”: the
Professional Association of the Magistracy (APM), Francisco de Vitoria Association,
Judges for Democracy, Independent Judicial Forum, Ágora and the National
Association of Judges. Limiting the analysis to the first three– the others have
a negligible number of members, although the Independent Judicial Forum is
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slowly increasing its membership –, the association to which the media attributes
a conservative bias – the APM – had 1,339 associates in 2019. The Francisco de
Vitoria Association is usually conceptualized as centrist, despite being a split from
the APM; it has 843 associates. The only association labeled as progressive –
Judges for Democracy – only has 462 members. Taking into account that in Spain
there are about 5,500 active judges and that about 3,000 of them are associated, the
ideological bias of the Spanish Justice is quite evident. And the role of associations
is also very relevant in promotions in the judiciary.
For this reason, if the members of the General Council of the Judiciary are to be
elected directly by the majority of the judges, the composition of the Council will
always follow a conservative pattern with not so many chances to become more
neutral. For this reason, in 1985 the Socialist Government, with an absolute majority
in Parliament, imposed by law that the members of the Council would be appointed
by a majority of 3/5 by the Congress and the Senate. Had it not done so, it is obvious
that the judicial establishment today would be even more conservative.
Now again, a socialist government, faced with the blockade in the renewal of the
General Council of the Judiciary, has presented on 13 October 2020 a Law to
the Parliament. It intends to prevent the Council from appointing judges when its
mandate has expired, which is logical and might boost negotiations for renewal.
The problem is that the law also intends that twelve of the twenty members of the
Council would be elected by an absolute majority in parliament, thus reducing the
3/5-majority that is currently required. Not only will this further politicize the election,
but it will hardly be accepted by the Council of Europe or even by the European
Comission. The parties supporting the Government will soon regret this reform. In a
few years, when the right-wing parties are in power, they may appoint the General
Council of the Judiciary to their liking and convenience. It is a decision which is
as reckless as that of the Democratic party in the US facing the same situation of
blockade of the Republican Party back in 2013. Today, on the eve of Trump’s third
appointment of a Justice for the US Supreme Court, Democrats regret their past
decision.
Starting at the beginning
There is no easy solution to all this, but it certainly goes through the first step of the
system: the access to judicial posts. The examination must be strictly objectified
with the double blind method, without any political influence. This will likely not only
make the ideological composition of the Spanish judiciary more plural, but make the
professional quality of the Spanish judges indisputable. Unfortunately, complaints in
this regard have not been uncommon in recent years, albeit unfair for some excellent
judges.
After that reform, in a few years judges shall directly elect their representatives to the
General Council of the Judiciary. Promoting this system now would be inappropriate,
because it would definitely deepen the conservative political bias. Meanwhile,
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what can be done now is to objectify the appointment of high courts’ judges. It is
necessary to proceed to a rating of merits and seniority that is not easy to build up,
but it can be done.
- 5 -
